Relative Effectiveness of Signals in IPOs in Indian Capital Markets by Kumar G Arun & Pandey, Ajay
1
Relative effectiveness of signals in IPOs in Indian Capital markets
Ajay Pandey & G. Arun Kumar
∗
                                                          
∗  Authors are members of faculty at Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad and Management
Development Institute, Gurgaon-122001, India respectively. They are thankful to the Management
Development Institute, Gurgaon for granting funds to support data-acquisition for this research project.
Corresponding Author: Ajay Pandey, Indian Institute of Management, Vastrapur, Ahmedabad-380015,
India. E-mail id: apandey@iimahd.ernet.in2
Abstract
IPO by a firm calls for assessment of potential agency problems and associated costs by the
outside investors. The potential conflict of interest problems between insiders and outsiders could
be very high in countries with weak corporate governance mechanisms like India. Theoretically it
could be argued that there are quite a few signals related to the firms in the IPO context and
available to the investors, which could be used by them to assess the quality of firms. Based on
cross-sectional data of 1243 IPOs in Indian markets during 1993-95 period, we find that the
under-pricing (or realized excess returns), inside equity and pre-public offer firm reservations
made for institutions and mutual funds explain the extent of oversubscription across IPOs. The
type of agency appraising the project and presence or absence of foreign financial and/or
technical collaborators fail to explain the extent of oversubscription across IPOs. In addition, we
find that subscription rate rather than realized initial returns as dependent variable sheds more
light on the effect of signals in a fixed-price open offer IPO process characterized by listing with
considerable lag.
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I. Introduction
Recent theoretical and empirical research in Corporate Finance have focussed on the
variations in corporate governance mechanisms across countries as determinants of
observed differences in financial structure of firms and capital market characteristics
across countries
1. The comprehensive survey work of Shleifer & Vishny (1997)
accelerated the works related to several of the issues raised in their article, including the
puzzle of “Finance without Governance”. The puzzle relates to as to how the firms in
countries with weak corporate governance mechanism are able to raise equity from
outside minority investors. Given the nature of equity contract, Shleifer & Vishny (1997)
argue that the costs of protecting outside investors from insiders and through complex
capital structures are not trivial even in countries with relatively strong governance
mechanisms. The puzzle of existence of outside equity without governance deepens
further considering the empirical evidence that equity markets are active and firms rely
heavily on outside equity in developing countries [Singh (1995)], wherein the corporate
governance mechanisms to protect outside investors are the weakest. In response to
this puzzle, there have been recent theoretical models [Fluck (1998), Gomes (2000), and
Myers (2000)] developed to explain the existence of outside equity without governance.
While in the models of Fluck and Myers, some primitive controls are assumed with
outside investors (to dismiss the insiders and to takeout proportionate share of assets
anytime respectively); in the dynamic model of Gomes, the insiders are able to credibly
signal and bind themselves to the outside investors through high inside equity.
In this study, our motivation has been to empirically investigate the complex set of
signals available to the outside investors at the time of IPOs by firms, which might allow
them to credibly infer the quality of firms/ insiders. Though the effectiveness of such
signals by itself in the IPO context may have limitation in explaining existence of outside
equity without governance due to substantial under-pricing as well as heavy over-
subscription observed at times
2 in Indian capital markets, yet we believe the unraveling
of importance of such signals might be key to understand and explain the puzzle of
finance without governance. Besides the plausible importance of signals by firms in
explaining “outside equity” without governance, there exists a long-standing tradition of
research on use of signals by the firms while coming out with IPOs. This paper is also a
natural extension of an earlier work by us [Pandey & ArunKumar (2001)] testing the
significance of inside equity in explaining cross section of investors’ response (over-
subscription) across IPOs. Besides extending the work to include more variables, other
than inside equity, which could be a credible signal; we also examined the
methodological issues related to using subscription rate as dependent variable and
specification of model. In this paper, we discuss and test relative advantage of using
subscription rate or oversubscription as a dependent variable as compared to under-
pricing (realized excess initial returns), which has been commonly used as dependent
variable in other studies. We also report the results in case under-pricing is used as
dependent variable. The data set used in the earlier work has been expanded to include
other proxy variables as signals besides inside equity. The paper is organized in five
sections. In Section II, we briefly review the literature and the research questions, which
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have motivated this research. In Section III, we discuss the methodological issues
related to use of over-subscription as the dependent variable. In Section IV, the findings
and results, along with research design and methodology used are presented. Finally in
Section V, we conclude by summarizing the results and their implications.
II. IPOs and Signals
In this section of the paper, our objective is limited to review theoretical and empirical
works which may have bearing on laying the emphasis on the cross-sectional
differences across firms coming to IPO markets, which could act as credible signals to
the investors to infer the quality of firms and the insiders. We have not attempted to
review the literature encompassing the research motivated by the issues related to
corporate governance and outside equity without governance, which have been covered
recently by Gomes (2000), Myers (2000) and earlier more extensively by Shleifer &
Vishny (1997). Just as inside equity could possibly be an effective signal [Gomes
(2000)], there are other possible voluntary choices made by the firms and their insiders,
which are costly and therefore could be credible enough to support existence of outside
equity. The use of signaling by the firms coming out with IPOs has already been in the
literature. Allen & Faulhaber (1989), Welch (1989), and Grinblatt & Hwang (1989)
modeled the under-pricing by firms as a signal following a dynamic strategy in which the
firms follow-up IPO with a seasoned equity offering. Under pricing in IPOs allows them to
fetch higher prices in seasoned offering(s). The empirical evidence pre-dominantly has
been against the hypothesized relationship between under-pricing and subsequent
seasoned issues [Garfinkel (1993), Jegadeesh, Weinstein & Welch (1993), and Michaely
& Shaw (1994)]. In addition to recent work of Gomes (2000) in the context of finance
without governance, Leland & Pyle (1977) had earlier modeled the inside equity as a
signal to indicate their private valuations. Downes & Heinkel (1982) found that the firms
with higher inside equity attracted higher valuations. It was critiqued later by Ritter (1984)
as the high inside equity implies lower agency costs and therefore, would result in higher
valuations.
The role of the underwriter /merchant banker itself has been seen as that of certifying
agent or a signal. Beatty & Ritter (1986), Booth & Smith (1986), Smith (1986), and
James (1992) have argued on these lines. Later, Chemmanur & Fulgheri (1994)
demonstrate in a multi-period model that it is possible for underwriters to develop
reputation by accurately pricing issues. Empirically, Carter & Manaster (1990), and
Michaely & Shaw (1994) provide evidence in support of this hypothesis. The auditors
[Titman & Trueman (1986)], venture capitals [Barry, Muscarella, Peavy & Vetsuypens
(1990), and Megginson & Weiss (1991)], and commercial banks [James & Weir (1990)]
have also been seen in a similar role to explain the under-pricing/initial returns across
IPOs.
In the context of weak corporate governance framework, i.e., lack of legal / institutional
protection of outside equity investors, in addition to these signal some other signals can
be thought of as credible. Even the presence of foreign financial collaborator could
mitigate the unbridled agency problems in such context. As long as the foreign
collaborator does not collude, his monitoring provides potentially an effective signal to
outside investors. He performs a role not very different than that of venture capitalist. On
the other hand, it is possible to argue that most of the time the collaborations are not
costly enough to provide any effective monitoring. If the costs in acquiring stake are
neutralized through gains on royalty, equipment, technology transfer fee etc., the signal5
can be mimicked easily by even low quality insiders. Technical collaborations, by their
very nature, are likely to be even less effective compared to financial collaborations. As
pointed out earlier that a large number of IPOs in India are for mobilization of funds for
projects being undertaken. In a large number of cases, the projects were requiring other
sources of fund (loan/debt) and were appraised by the lending entity. Sometimes even if
additional funding is not required, the firms would voluntarily get the projects appraised.
The type and quality of the appraiser also could be a signal, if we allow for reputational
capital of the appraising agency.
In the Indian context for the two-year period covered in the study (1
st April 1993 to 31
st
March 1995), the process followed was not based on book building
3. Outside US, fixed-
price open offers without Green shoe provisions have been common in countries such
as UK, Hong Kong & Singapore [Kang (1995)]. The offer price was determined much in
advance (2-3 months) before the issue as the offer document with offer price was
submitted to the regulator (Securities & Exchange Board of India, SEBI) and investors
could invest only at the offer price. If the issue was oversubscribed, the allocation was
made through drawl of lottery and both the probabilities and amount of allocation were
biased in favor of smallest investor. The listing after issue closed was usually after 3-5
months, after compiling applications, allotment process and issue of physical shares.
Given these lag and allotment rules, the initial returns strictly speaking are the valuation
differences between a segment of market and wider market. Kang (1995) finds in an
empirical study of 147 IPOs spread over 1986-1992 period that IPOs with greater
allocation bias favoring small investors in Hong Kong also had relatively higher first-day
returns and were mostly under-priced. He argues that fixed-price offerings impose
greater risks for underwriters and hence the offer price are set lower compared to other
underwriting methods/ IPO process such as book-building. Despite implications for level
of under-pricing, one advantage that fixed-price open offer process offers for research is
that the level of investor response (over-subscription) also becomes available as an
attribute for study. Controlling for under-pricing / initial returns, any of the signals
hypothesized above can be tested for their significance in explaining the over-
subscription. The methodological issues related to use of this variable are discussed
elsewhere in the paper.
In the process of initial offering of shares followed in India, firm reservations
4 were made
to institutional investors and mutual funds as well on the same offer price. These
reservations also are a plausible signal indicating the quality of firm or insiders, as
monitoring by them, even if they are minority shareholders, is likely to be more effective
than dispersed shareholders. The firm reservation for institutional investors and mutual
funds is unlike ex-post share allocation bias in their favor in US, as in Benveniste &
Wilhelm (1990). The firm reservations were made much before the fixed-price public-
offer and were disclosed in the offer document and therefore, could be a credible signal.
In a similar vein, the asset characteristics of the firm could be a credible signal. If a firm
has large proportion of its assets, which are fungible and are not specific to the firm, then
the quality of IPO is likely to be low. While it is difficult to characterize the assets of an
IPO firm, one would expect the financial services and trading firms to be viewed
suspiciously by the investors.
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III. Methodological Issues
A. Initial Returns or Over-subscription
The under-pricing of IPOs is a well-known and extensively documented empirical reality
worldwide. Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist (1994), and Ibbotson & Ritter (1995), in their
reviews, have also compiled the various hypotheses advanced to explain under-pricing
of IPOs. In order to evaluate the effect of any firm or IPO related attribute as signal, the
under-pricing (initial returns on listing) has been used as dependent variable in the
studies cited above. With the fixed-price open offer process of IPOs followed during the
period under study in India, both the under-pricing and over-subscription are measurable
as response to any signal. In case of instantaneous IPO process, they are equivalent
measures as well because the under-pricing will linearly determine over-subscription.
Strictly, the under-pricing refers to the difference between “unobserved” fair market price
at the time of offer even though it is measured ex-post. If the lag between IPO process
and after-market is not substantial, the measured initial returns are conveniently thought
of as “under-pricing”. Clearly, the initial returns are also expected to be highly correlated
as well [Chemmanur (1993), Beaty & Ritter (1986)] if the over-subscription captures the
quality and/or pricing of an IPO
5. To the extent, over-subscription completely specifies
the quality of firm/IPO or realized initial returns completely specify true under-pricing; no
other signal would have any significant explanatory power in explaining either of these
two. In other words, any other signal would fail to explain the realized initial returns if
over-subscription captures the effect of all signals. Similarly, the over-subscription would
not be explained by any other signal if the realized return were a perfect proxy for “true”
expected return. This is empirically testable by using both the variables as dependent
variable alternately. Our intuition behind using over-subscription as dependent variable
in Indian context was motivated by the fact that realized initial returns, as measure of
true expected initial returns, are measured with considerable lag and might be noisy
enough to induce investors to rely on other signals as well while subscribing to the issue.
The realized initial returns are only available variable as a proxy for true expected initial
returns. Since the realized initial returns are measured with considerable lag, the
substantial change in information set induces measurement errors in using realized initial
returns. Even if the measurement errors were unbiased, their use would result in
downward bias and inconsistency in coefficients of cross-sectional OLS regression. The
variance of these errors is expected to be positively related to the time lag between IPO
process and listing. With the considerable delay in listing in India during the period under
study, the results are expected to be weak. The measurement problem remains
irrespective of using over-subscription or initial returns as dependent variable
6. In the
other markets having fixed-price open offer process, the subscription rate or over-
subscription has not been used frequently
7. If subscription rate is viewed as indicator of
quality, then it is determined ex-post (after the completion of IPO) and that presumably
might have been the reason why studies have not used it extensively. However, as a
dependent variable, the timing of determination is not relevant. Eventually we contrast
the results with under-pricing as dependent variable with various signals and over-
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“true” expected initial returns.
6 Though measurement errors in independent variable(s) make estimates of regression unbiased.
7 Very few, studies including the one by Kang (1995) have used subscription rate, which has also used it as independent
variable proxying for IPO quality.7
subscription as independent variables as it allows us to infer empirically whether
subscription rate/over-subscription captures IPO quality better or whether realized
returns capture true expected returns better.
B. Choice of period
The next methodological issue faced in the study was the choice of period of study. In
India, the office of Controller of Capital Issues (CCI) under Ministry of Finance controlled
the pricing as well as issue of equity by firms till 1993, in case the firms wanted public
financing of equity. Besides acting as a regulator, the control on pricing by CCI was a
reflection of the widespread use of price and output controls by the Government till
economic reforms started in 1991. After 1993, Securities & Exchange Board of India
(SEBI), an independent regulator started regulating the public equity financing (including
IPOs). Initially, its role included vetting of offer documents but the pricing was left to the
firm subject to qualification criteria laid out in the regulation which were not very
restrictive for firms earning profits in the past few years. SEBI continued vetting the offer
documents till March 1995, after which it stopped vetting of offer documents amidst
controversy surrounding a high-priced seasoned equity offering. In that specific case, it
came out that SEBI officials had allowed the guidelines to be violated. After 1995, the
IPO activity slowed down considerably. Even though IPOs continued for a while, the mal-
practices in form of self-dealing in the secondary market and IPOs primarily being made
to rig the prices in the secondary market through circular trading became common
8. As a
result, the genuine investor response also receded and the IPOs were made only to get
the stock listed, even if it meant insiders indirectly investing their own money.
The collapse of IPO markets was followed by the withdrawal of vetting of offer document
by SEBI. It can be argued that both CCI and SEBI, as regulators, might have been
“screening” institutions controlling the quality of firms approaching the market. As CCI
was also controlling pricing of issues, the under-pricing prevailing then might have been
manifestation of conservative valuations and prices forced by the CCI. We therefore
have limited this study to a two-year period coinciding with abolition of price controls of
CCI and existence of relatively active IPO market, i.e., after SEBI’s withdrawal. Despite
eliminating firms whose IPOs were not initially listed at BSE, we still had data from 1243
IPOs, which is an evidence of hectic activity in the IPO market during the period.
IV. Empirical Tests of significance of signals in Indian IPO markets
A. Data-set and Variables used in the study
As in an earlier study [Pandey & ArunKumar (2001)], we used the data taken from
PRIME database for various IPOs made during the two-year period of April 1993- March
1995. Since the database included all primary issues, it was screened for IPOs and only
those IPOs, which were listed on BSE (Bombay Stock Exchange, the largest exchange
in India at that time) within 6 months from the close of offer date, were considered. The
screening criterion of restricting the sample to BSE listed IPOs was due to ease of
getting reliable price information on the exchange’s web-site (www.bseindia.com) & other
databases such as PROWESS of Center for monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). This
screening resulted in 1243 IPOs listed on BSE during the period, out of 1959 issues
9
reported in the database.
                                                          
8 It is difficult to establish that such practices were going on. Few such cases were detected by SEBI, but
markets as well as the media were abuzz with such rumors/stories.
9 Prime database has all primary issues including issues of convertible debt, rights issues and preference shares.8
Unlike the previous study, in which we tested the significance of inside equity in
explaining the investor response, in this study we used various variables, for which data
was available and which could be considered as potential signal. Inside equity, firm
reservations made for the mutual funds and institutions, type of appraising agency,
presence of financial and technical collaborators could be potential signals or the
variables on which data was available and have been used. The quality of merchant
bankers in Indian context is difficult to ascertain, as the industry was too nascent during
the period under study. However, the all India financial institutions and commercial
banks in that order can be though more credible as a class. Similar problems arise in
assigning quality to the collaborating entities in case of financial and technical
collaborations. In case of former, we adopted classification by class (bank/ all India
financial institution/ state level financial institution/ private/ none) and in case of latter,
just the presence/ absence. The description of various variables used in the study is
given in Table 1. The variables EXCESRET and OVERSUB denote under-pricing (or
realized excess initial returns) and the investors’ response and were used as dependent
variables independently, with the other one being independent variable. The reason for
doing the same has been discussed in the previous section.
The measure of realized excess returns (EXCESRET) was calculated as the return on
listing adjusted for market returns during the corresponding period:
EXCESRET =
 [{Listing Price- Offer Price} - {Market Index on listing day- Market Index on offer day}]
Offer Price Market Index on offer day
BSE Sensitive Index consisting of 30 high capitalization stocks was used as proxy for
market returns for adjustment.
B. Regression Model Specification
Over-subscription as Dependent Variable
The following specifications were used to investigate the effect of IPO related signals on
the subscription rate or over-subscription:
OVERSUB = β0  + β1 EXCESRET + Σ βK OTHER K  + ε (1)
   k
Where the βI  (I= 0,1,..11) are regression parameters to be estimated; ε is a normally
distributed random error term; and  OTHERk  are signals related to IPO quality.
As argued earlier, we expect a positive relationship between the investor response
(OVERSUB) and realized initial returns (EXCESRET) to the extent, the initial returns ex-
post reflect true expected returns. Kang (1995) has reported the same in his study of
IPOs in Hong Kong.
The level of inside equity has been found to signal IPO quality or a determinant of
realized initial returns. In addition to Downes & Heinkel (1982) & Leland & Pyle (1977), a9
positive relation between realized returns (EXCESRET) and inside equity (INEQ) is
hypothesized in the literature to the extent subscription rate (OVERSUB) does not
capture entirely the quality of IPO [Grinblatt & Hwang (1989), Szewezyk, Tsetsekos &
Varma (1992)]. Kang (1995) in his study however, reports no significant relationship
between inside equity and realized returns after controlling for subscription rate. In our
model however, we expect the relationship between subscription rate (OVERSUB) and
inside equity (INEQ) to be positive without any qualification for obvious reasons.
Size of an issue has been used often as a variable reflecting the IPO quality; larger the
size lesser is the uncertainty about IPO quality. We have used issue size as the proxy for
the same. Since the sampling distribution of issue size exhibits excessive variability, we
have log-transformed the issue size (SIZE) as has been done in studies by Kang (1995),
Beatty & Ritter (1986), and McGuinness (1992).
As discussed earlier, firm reservations made for institutional investors (RESV) as a
variable could signal the quality of an issue and we expected a positive relationship with
the dependent variable. Similarly, we expect positive association of dependent variable
with presence of foreign financial or technical collaboration (DUMMYFC or DUMMYTC)
and with presence of all-India financial institution (DUMMYI) as project appraising
agency. Given the difficulty of reputation-based rankings, a-priori we do not expect any
association of dependent variable with any other type of appraising agency (DUMMYB,
DUMMYS, DUMMYP). Due to poor asset-specificity of financial service and trading
firms, we expect positive association between subscription rate and other types of firms
(DUMMYIND). We also expect negative intercept reflecting the quality of issues from
financial sector /trading firms or without any appraisal or collaboration.
Realized Initial Returns as Dependent Variable
The following specifications were used to investigate the effect of IPO related signals on
the realized excess initial returns:
EXCESRET = β0  + β1 OVERSUB + Σ βK OTHER K  + ε (2)
k
Where the βI  (I= 0,1,..11) are regression parameters to be estimated; ε is a normally
distributed random error term; and  OTHERk  are signals related to IPO quality.
Though this is commonly used specification in IPO related studies, we would expect the
effect of signals (OTHERk) only to the extent it has not been captured by subscription
rate (OVERSUB). If indeed subscription rate reflects all other characteristics of the
firm/IPO quality, we expect no association between dependent variable and all other
independent variables except subscription rate (OVERSUB). There is no basis of
expecting any relationship after controlling for subscription rate. Existence or otherwise
of any such relationship has to seen empirically to speculate further.
C. Sample Characteristics
During the period under study, the realized excess initial returns in IPOs were very high
at aprrox. 68%. This is high in comparison to 15.3% in US, 12.0% in UK, 11.1% in
Germany and 32.5% in Japan as compiled in Ibbotson & Ritter (1995). However in the10
table compiled by them, under-pricing or initial returns in countries like Brazil (78.5%),
Korea (78.1%), and Malaysia (80.3%) are even higher. The comparisons are also
difficult as the samples studied in developed markets span longer time-period besides
substantial differences in the process followed for IPOs across countries. In Indian
context, a study by Shah (1995) reports even higher realized excess returns of about
90%. His sample covers in addition to the period covered in this study, IPOs from 1991
onwards. We restricted our study to a narrower window as till 1993, the regulator priced
the issues as pointed out elsewhere. Large under-pricing seen in Indian IPO market
could also be due to considerable time lag between IPO completion and listing as the
investors may require compensation for having illiquid holding in a risky asset if they are
subsequently allotted shares.
The distribution of both the subscription rate as well as realized initial returns across
IPOs is skewed to the left indicating a large number of IPOs didn’t have very large
subscription rate and high realized returns, while a few had very large subscription rate
and very high realized returns. Since the database consists of completed issues only,
the minimum subscription rate was 1 with maximum being 117 times. Though not shown
in the table, 225 IPOs resulted in negative realized excess returns with minimum being
negative excess returns of over -110% (adjusting for market returns). The maximum
realized excess return on the other hand was as high as 1455%. Given the high
variability and skewed distribution of variables EXCESRET & OVERSUB, we also tested
their log-transformations. The inside equity also was fairly large with median at 44%.
This needs to be interpreted keeping in mind the minimum prevalent regulatory
requirement of 25%. On an average, a reasonably large portion (28-29%) of the offer
was reserved for institutional investor and mutual funds. The number of IPOs of firms
with foreign financial or technical collaboration was 7.3% and 16.7% of the total
respectively. A large proportion of IPOs was with projects appraised by Banks (27%), All-
India financial institutions (23%), Private financial firms (21%) or State-level financial
institutions (9%). IPOs from financial services and trading firms also were only 16.7% of
all IPOs.
D. OLS Regression Results
Over-subscription as Dependent Variable
Table 3 reports the OLS regression results with over-subscription rate as the dependent
variable. The realized return, inside equity, firm reservations made for institutional
investors and the intercept all have significant explanatory power in explaining investors’
response or over-subscription across IPOs and all the signs are as hypothesized. Only
the coefficient associated with dummy variable –DUMMYFC, indicating IPOs of firms
with foreign financial collaboration has unexpected negative sign. A look at the raw data
suggests that these collaborations were more concentrated in the industries of
aquaculture, textile, food products and chemicals. A plausible reason for the negative
sign might be the quality of collaboration or low quality of issues in these industries for
which the dummy variable is acting as proxy.
The adjusted R
2, is low at 0.331 compared to other studies explaining cross-sectional
variation in initial returns, despite using similar model specification and lesser number of
variables [Kang (1995) reports 0.6 in his study of Honk Kong IPOs]. This could be due to
several plausible reasons. The use of subscription rate as dependent variable could11
have resulted in inappropriate model specification. This is not the case as we later show
that using realized returns does not increase the explanatory power of the regression.
Alternatively, the severe measurement error associated with using realized initial return
as proxy for true expected returns due to large time lag, could be the reason for poor
explanatory power. Another reason could be use of inappropriate functional form. Using
semi-log model specification with log transformation of dependent variable, subscription
rate (OVERSUB) and independent variable, realized excess return (EXCESRET)
improves the adjusted R
2 somewhat, as can be seen in Table 3A, without changing the
significance of other coefficients.
Over-subscription as Dependent Variable (Semi Log specification)
Observing large variation and skewed distribution of subscription rates and realized
returns, we also tested an alternative semi log model of the form:
Ln (OVERSUB) = β0  + β1 Ln (EXCESRET) + Σ βK OTHER K  + ε (3)
Where the βI  (I= 0,1,..11) are regression parameters to be estimated; ε is a normally
distributed random error term; and  OTHERk  are signals related to IPO quality. Since in
the earlier model specification, the realized excess returns could have been negative,
the price relatives were used to compute Ln (EXCESRET) as:
Ln (EXCESRET) = Ln (Price on Listing/ Offer Price)- Ln (Index at Listing/ Index at Offer)
Table 3A reports the results with the semi-log model specification [equation (3)]. While
the explanatory power of regression model improves in term of adjusted R
2 to 0.39 as
opposed to 0.33 with linear specification, the realized excess returns, inside equity and
firm reservations made to the institutional investors continue to be significant variables
explaining investors’ response to firms’ IPOs. The only change is in the significance level
of intercept, which drops considerably and becomes insignificant. These results suggest
that realized initial returns as a proxy for true expected returns do not completely explain
the investors response and if conceptually the only determinant of investors’ response
are true expected returns, then the signals such as inside equity and reservations for
institutional investors are positively correlated with measurement error.
Realized Initial Returns as Dependent Variable (Linear and semi-log specification)
Table 4 reports results based on equation (2) as model specification using
conventionally used realized initial excess return as dependent variable. The use of
realized excess return has been obviously important to researchers as the interest in the
IPO studies has been motivated by well-documented anomaly of their “under-pricing”,
i.e., substantially high initial excess returns. As argued earlier, use of realized excess
return, as dependent variable in the fixed-price open offer IPO process, to test the
effectiveness of signals is problematic. In case the subscription rate already reflects the
quality of an IPO or the effect of all other signals as would be expected, then any other
signal/ firm-specific attribute is not likely to be significant in explaining cross-sectional
variations across IPOs. The results seem to vindicate this intuition.
The subscription rate remains significant in explaining high realized returns but all other
signals found significant earlier are not significant. The subscription rate seemingly
captures all aspects of quality to determine ex-post realized returns except the inherent12
“under-pricing” of IPOs and size. Though insignificant, the signs of some of the variables
are interesting. In case of inside equity, the sign is consistent with existing studies. In
case of firm reservation made to institutional investors, the sign is consistent with the
argument that the IPO if sold to institutional investors need to be under-priced less. The
OLS estimates of the model are characterized by a large positive and significant
intercept. It indicates that firms need to under-price. It is also consistent with a large
negative intercept with the model earlier, indicating that investors will invest in IPOs only
if other signals and under-pricing are favorable. Despite realized initial returns being
measured when all other variables are known (unlike the previous model where the
realized returns get determined much after the subscription rate), the overall explanatory
power of the model in term of adjusted R
2 is relatively lower.
The only other variable, which is significant in explaining the realized excess returns, is
size. The results indicate that large issues need to be relatively less under-priced.
Table 4A reports the results of OLS regression of semi-log equation form of the
specification of the form:
Ln (EXCESRET) = β0  + β1 Ln (OVERSUB) + Σ βK OTHER K  + ε (4)
  k
Where the βI  (I= 0,1,..11) are regression parameters to be estimated; ε is a normally
distributed random error term; and  OTHERk  are signals related to IPO quality, as in the
previous specifications.
The change in model from linear to semi-log specification does not affect the base
results except improving the overall explanatory power in term of adjusted R
2 (from .298
to .341) and making dummy associated with manufacturing firms’ IPOs significant in
explaining realized initial excess returns.
To summarize, the regression results are consistent with- (1) “under-pricing” in IPOs,
which is lesser for larger-sized and manufacturing sector issues; (2) investor response to
an issue gets explained by inside equity and firm reservations made to the institutional
investors before the offer as signals in additional to realized returns; (3) the signals
explaining investor response in turn might be significant, to the extent the realized
excess returns are measured with errors or alternatively, independent signals of IPO
quality; and (4) the investors’ response measured through subscription rate as
dependent variable seems to account for IPO quality comprehensively.
E. Robustness of Results
Omitted variables, IPOs at par
As our primary interest was in exploring the determinants of investors’ response across
IPOs, we subjected the semi-log model specification [specified in equation (3)] for
checking the robustness of results. We were however severely constrained by data
availability for some of the variables we would have liked to include. Since considerable
time had elapsed, the prospectus availability was not easy. Variables reflecting the
quality of firm and insiders, such as age, profitability in the past, dividend track-record
etc.; are only available from the prospectus for firms coming with IPOs. These variables
could be important in explaining the investor response or under-pricing, but have not13
been included in the analysis by us. Model mis-specification due to omitted variables
remains weakness in our results, though we used issues at par as proxy for firm’s profit
and age history. The regulations in India have been always liberal in allowing very young
and start-up firms to bring their IPOs. The regulator (Securities & Exchange Board of
India, SEBI) allowed such firms to bring-out their IPOs, but such firms (or for that matter
firms not having 3 years track-record of profits/dividends) were allowed to come with
IPOs at par (i.e., at the face value of shares implying at same price as insiders). Out of a
total of 1243 issues analyzed, 842 IPOs were made at par indicating a large number of
IPOs by very young firms. We included another dummy variable (DUMMYPRM) in our
previous specification as one of the quality variable in equation (3) & (4) to test whether
the relationships remain significant. The variable took a value of 1 in case an IPO was
made at a premium and 0 in case the IPO was at par. Table 5 & 6 report the effect of
including the dummy variable for premium issues.
In case of over-subscription, the coefficient of the dummy variable is significant and has
the expected sign. Since the issues at premium are from relatively older firms with a
track record, one would expect positive association between investor response and the
dummy variable and negative association between excess initial returns and the dummy
variable. The effect of par issues also results in the size variable and intercept in the
regression unexpectedly changing their sign and becoming significant at 5%. The
explanatory power of the regression, in terms of adjusted R
2 improves very marginally
(from 0.390 to 0.407).
In case of realized excess returns, the par issues seem to have higher initial excess
returns implying less under-pricing by firms with profit track record, the issues at
premium being proxy for the same. This is reflected in significant negative relationship
between LNEXCESRET and DUMMYPRM. Like in previous case, there is a change in
other variables' significance, with inside equity becoming significant and size becoming
insignificant in explaining initial excess returns.
The inclusion of the dummy variable for par issues does not affect the baseline results
with respect to role of inside equity and firm institutional reservations in explaining
subscription rate across issues. However, the effect of size on the “under-pricing” is
replaced by the less “under-pricing” by relatively older firms. Similarly, the subscription or
investor response also is significantly positive for such older firms despite less “under-
pricing”.
 Multi-Collinearity
Even though the classical manifestation of high R
2 was not present, the pair-wise zero-
order correlation coefficients across independent variables are reported in Table 7. The
maximum correlation of 0.47 is between size and dummy variable, DUMMYPRM,
indicating that premium issues were of a larger size in the sample. The next highest
correlation of 0.406 was also observed between the same dummy variable and inside
equity. Other correlation coefficients, though significant, were below +/- 0.32.
Heteroskedasticity, advantage to semi-log specification14
In order to check for presence of heteroskedasticity, we used White’s test-statistic on
both linear and semi-log specification. In both the cases, the null hypothesis of
homoskedasticity was rejected at 5% significance with chi-squared statistics of 364.20 &
88.25 (degrees of freedom = 54) respectively. In linear specification of the model, the
error terms are highly correlated with the realized excess returns. While performing
White’s procedure, the test-statistic remains at a very high 256.08 in case of linear
specification but drops to acceptable 16.16 (degrees of freedom = 12) in case of semi-
log specification, if cross product and square terms are dropped from auxiliary
regressions. With the semi-log specification, the error terms do not seem to be related to
the explanatory variables and the marginal heteroskedasticity indicated by White’s
statistics could as well be due to model mis-specification. Using Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test for heteroskedastic variance being positively related to independent variables, the
chi-squared statistics of 14.50 (degree of freedom =12) in case of semi-log specification
accepts the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity at 5% significance level.
Influential Observations
In order to check for the results being driven by influential observations, we estimated
the parameters of equation (3) after ordering the sample on subscription rate and
realized excess returns and after dropping 100 IPOs at both the ends separately. All the
4 variables, viz., inside equity, firm reservations, size and dummy variable for premium
issues remain significant.
To summarize, the results seem fairly robust despite the possibility of having omitted
variables, which could be the cause for model mis-specification. In any case, there is no
theoretical guidance available to include any particular set of variables in trying to
explain the subscription rate or investor response except the under-pricing. We would
have liked to include some more measures of the quality of investment bankers,
financiers, age of the firm etc., but were constrained by difficulty of getting data. The
question of stability of the results across time-periods also remained untouched by us.
V. Findings and further research
Our objective in the study of IPOs in India, an emerging market, was to test the
significance of some of the firm specific or IPO process related attributes in explaining
the investor response and well documented under-pricing across IPOs. In case these
attributes or signals are seen as credible enough by the investors, they may also help in
explaining at least partially the puzzle of “outside equity”. In the process of this analysis,
there were other issues as well. Firstly, whether the under-pricing itself will not influence
the investor response, if under-pricing is significantly independent of the signals and
attributes being analyzed. A somewhat related issue is- if the subscription rate or
investor response subsumes the IPO or firm quality, one would not expect the realized
excess returns, ex post, to be explained by any other signal or attribute. Led by these
arguments, we tested the significance of some of the theoretically as well as popularly
cited attributes of firm or the IPO in explaining subscription rate.
Our results indicate that inside equity, firm reservations made to institutional investors
before the offer and realized excess returns significantly explain the investor response
/subscription rate. Similarly, the issues made at premium (allowed by the regulator to
only profitable firms) also affect subscription significantly. We did not find any significant
relationship between subscription rate and type of project appraising agency involved by15
the firm and presence of foreign technical and financial collaborators. Unlike subscription
rate, under-pricing by firms was completely explained by subscription rate except for
firms with profitable track record (IPOs at premium) or for manufacturing firms. Such
issues were comparatively less under-priced.
Our results show that subscription rate is an important variable for any study on IPOs in
Indian context, where the IPO process followed was fixed-price open offer process.
Traditionally IPO studies have focussed on under-pricing / realized initial returns.
Though we performed usual tests for robustness, the stability of the results across
different time-periods needs to be empirically tested. Similarly, refinement in some of the
attributes used by us and inclusion of more such attributes and signals would shed more
light on the information processing by investors to infer IPO quality in contexts, where
their interests are in any case very weakly protected. Now in India, firms can use both
fixed-price open offer and book-building processes. This has also led to the possibility of
empirically assessing the relative differences in the importance of the firm or IPO specific
attributes. The results of such studies and the insights related to information processing
by investors/ markets, besides improving academic understanding, could also be
possibly used to strengthen the institutional and regulatory framework for IPOs. A key
issue facing emerging markets is to evolve regulatory framework for IPOs recognizing
weak corporate governance and making maximum use of information processing
abilities of the market itself.16





* Number of times the issue was subscribed,
Number of shares applied for divided by
number of shares on offer.
EXCESRET D/I
* Realized excess returns on listing, percentage
returns on listing (listing price-offer price)/offer
price, adjusted for market returns using BSE
sensitive Index.
INEQ I Inside Equity, measured as % age of total post-
offer number of shares held by insiders.
SIZE I Size of Issue, log-transformed offer size in tens
of million (a crore) in Rupees.
RESV I Firm Reservations made in favor of institutional
investors and mutual funds measured in
percentage of the total offer size.
DUMMYB I Dummy variable; takes value of 1 if a Bank has
appraised IPO related project other wise 0.
DUMMYI I Dummy variable; takes value of 1 if an all-India
Financial Institution has appraised IPO related
project other wise 0.
DUMMYS I Dummy variable; takes value of 1 if a state
level Financial Institution has appraised IPO
related project other wise 0.
DUMMYP I Dummy variable; takes value of 1 if any private
sector Financial Institution has appraised IPO
related project other wise 0.
DUMMYFC I Dummy variable; takes value of 1 if the firm has
any foreign financial collaboration other wise 0.
DUMMYTC I Dummy variable; takes value of 1 if the firm has
any foreign technical collaboration other wise 0.
DUMMYIND I Dummy variable; takes value of 1 unless the
firm is in financial services or trading, in which
case it is 0.
* Used alternately as Dependent variable.17
Table 2. Sample Characteristics: 1243 IPOs
Mean Median Standard Dev.
Continuous Variables
Times subscribed (OVERSUB) 10.10 4.35 14.64
Realized excess returns (EXCESRET) 69.79% 39.16% 115.23%
Post-issue Inside Equity (INEQ) 47.00% 44.00% 14.89%
Log of offer size (SIZE) 5.80 5.70 0.75
% of offer reserved for FIs/MFs (RESV) 29.77% 28.57% 20.42%
Nominal Variables Number of IPOs
Appraised by Banks (DUMMYB) 336
Appraised by National FIs (DUMMYI) 290
Appraised by State FIs (DUMMYS) 115
Appraised by Others (DUMMYP) 258
Financial Collaboration (DUMMYFC) 91
Technical Collaboration (DUMMYTC) 208
Financial & Trading Firms (DUMMYIND) 20818
Table 3. OLS Regression results with linear specification: N-1243
 OVERSUB as dependent variable
Variables Estimates of
Coefficients
Std. Error t-statistics Significance
level






Inside Equity (INEQ) 14.612 2.486 5.879
∗∗ .000





Projects appraised by Banks
(DUMMYB)
1.760 1.097 1.605 .109
Project appraised by all-
India FI s (DUMMYI)
.900 1.159 .777 .437
Project appraised by state
FI s (DUMMYS)
-.364 1.460 -.250 .803
Project appraised by other
firms (DUMMYP)
1.518 1.148 1.323 .186
Firms with foreign financial
collaborations (DUMMYFC)
-.669 1.520 -.439 .661
Firms with foreign technical
collaborations  (DUMMYTC)
1.038 1.076 .965 .335
Manufacturing firms
(DUMMYIND)
.505 1.002 .504 .614
R
2 = 0.337, Adj. R
2 = 0.331, F-statistic = 56.835 (significant at 1%)
∗ Significant at 5%
∗∗ Significant at 1%19
Table 3A. OLS Regression results with semi-log specification: N-1243
LNOVERSUB as dependent variable
Variables Estimates of
Coefficients
Std. Error t-statistics Significance
level
Intercept -.091 .261 -.350 .726




Inside Equity (INEQ) 1.482 .194 7.622
∗∗ .000





Projects appraised by Banks
(DUMMYB)
0.069 .086 .810 .418
Project appraised by all-
India FI s (DUMMYI)
-0.011 .091 -.121 .903
Project appraised by state
FI s (DUMMYS)
-0.083 .114 -.729 .466
Project appraised by other
firms (DUMMYP)
0.048 .090 .535 .593
Firms with foreign financial
collaborations (DUMMYFC)
-0.003 .119 -.025 .980
Firms with foreign technical
collaborations  (DUMMYTC)
0.108 .084 1.286 .199
Manufacturing firms
(DUMMYIND)
0.104 .078 1.323 .186
R
2 = 0.395, Adj. R
2 = 0.390, F-statistic = 73.164 (significant at 1%)
∗∗ Significant at 1%20
Table 4. OLS Regression results with linear specification: N-1243
EXCESRET as dependent variable
Variables Estimates of
Coefficients
Std. Error t-statistics Significance
level






Inside Equity (INEQ) .216 .209 1.061 .289




-.190 .150 -1.267 .205
Projects appraised by Banks
(DUMMYB)
-.028 .089 -.321 .748
Project appraised by all-
India FI s (DUMMYI)
.092 .093 .985 .325
Project appraised by state
FI s (DUMMYS)
-.013 .118 -.106 .916
Project appraised by other
firms (DUMMYP)
-.012 .093 -.129 .897
Firms with foreign financial
collaborations (DUMMYFC)
.110 .121 .909 .363
Firms with foreign technical
collaborations  (DUMMYTC)
.037 .087 .428 .669
Manufacturing firms
(DUMMYIND)
-.144 .081 -1.783 .075
R
2 = 0.304, Adj. R
2 = 0.298, F-statistic = 48.979 (significant at 1%)
∗ Significant at 5%
∗∗ Significant at 1%21
Table 4A. OLS Regression results with Semi-log specification: N-1243
LNEXCESRET as dependent variable
Variables Estimates of
Coefficients
Std. Error t-statistics Significance
level






Inside Equity (INEQ) -.006 .086 -.068 .946




-.059 .063 -.928 .354
Projects appraised by Banks
(DUMMYB)
-.014 .037 -.371 .710
Project appraised by all-
India FI s (DUMMYI)
.039 .039 .987 .324
Project appraised by state
FI s (DUMMYS)
.000 .049 .001 .999
Project appraised by other
firms (DUMMYP)
.007 .039 .178 .859
Firms with foreign financial
collaborations (DUMMYFC)
.051 .051 1.106 .269
Firms with foreign technical
collaborations  (DUMMYTC)






2 = 0.346, Adj. R
2 = 0.341, F-statistic = 59.302 (significant at 1%)
∗ Significant at 5%
∗∗ Significant at 1%22
Table 5. Effect of par issues on Over-subscription (semi-log specification: N-1243)
LNOVERSUB as dependent variable
Variables Estimates of
Coefficients
Std. Error t-statistics Significance
level
Intercept .704 .290 2.427
∗ .015




Inside Equity (INEQ) .877 .217 4.044
∗∗ .000






Projects appraised by Banks
(DUMMYB)
.060 .085 .711 .977
Project appraised by all-
India FI s (DUMMYI)
.014 .089 .162 .872
Project appraised by state
FI s (DUMMYS)
-.084 .113 -.747 .455
Project appraised by other
firms (DUMMYP)
.031 .089 .356 .722
Firms with foreign financial
collaborations (DUMMYFC)
.062 .118 .525 .600
Firms with foreign technical
collaborations  (DUMMYTC)
.126 .083 1.518 .129
Manufacturing firms
(DUMMYIND)






2 = 0.412, Adj. R
2 = 0.407, F-statistic = 71.934 (significant at 1%)
∗∗ Significant at 1%
∗ Significant at 5%23
Table 6. Effect of par issues on Excess Initial Returns (semi-log specification: N-
1243)
LNEXCESRET as dependent variable
Variables Estimates of
Coefficients
Std. Error t-statistics Significance
level
Intercept .107 .125 .852 .394




Inside Equity (INEQ) .268 .094 2.867
∗∗ .004
Log of issue size (SIZE) -.010 .019 -.524 .600
Institutional investors’
reservations (RESV)
-.107 .062 -1.710 .088
Projects appraised by Banks
(DUMMYB)
-.010 .036 -.266 .790
Project appraised by all-
India FI s (DUMMYI)
.025 .038 .650 .516
Project appraised by state
FI s (DUMMYS)
.001 .048 .034 .973
Project appraised by other
firms (DUMMYP)
.014 .038 .368 .713
Firms with foreign financial
collaborations (DUMMYFC)
.026 .051 .515 .607
Firms with foreign technical
collaborations  (DUMMYTC)










2 = 0.370, Adj. R
2 = 0.364, F-statistic = 60.181 (significant at 1%)
∗∗ Significant at 1%
∗ Significant at 5%2425
Table 7. Pair-wise Zero-order Correlation among Independent Variables
LNEXRET INEQ SIZERESV DUMMYB DUMMYI DUMMYS DUMMYP DUMMYFC DUMMYTCDUMMYIND DUMMYPRM
LNEXRET Correlation 1.000 .160 -.167 .165 -.049 .056 -.048 -.015 .066 .054 -.076 -.123
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 .000 .085 .048 .091 .606 .020 .059 .007 .000
INEQ Correlation .160 1.000 .019 .048 -.194 .142 -.141 -.113 .046 .038 -.074 .406
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .511 .092 .000 .000 .000 .000 .102 .178 .009 .000
SIZE Correlation -.167 .019 1.000 -.314 .015 .116 -.095 .037 .073 .082 .148 .470
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .511 . .000 .602 .000 .001 .191 .010 .004 .000 .000
RESV Correlation .165 .048 -.314 1.000 -.040 .168 -.021 -.009 .126 .112 .033 -.225
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .092 .000 . .161 .000 .454 .761 .000 .000 .249 .000
DUMMYB Correlation -.049 -.194 .015 -.040 1.000 -.336 -.194 -.311 .010 -.006 .006 -.044
Sig. (2-tailed) .085 .000 .602 .161 . .000 .000 .000 .731 .834 .834 .120
DUMMYI Correlation .056 .142 .116 .168 -.336 1.000 -.176 -.282 .122 .186 .222 .022
Sig. (2-tailed) .048 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .435
DUMMYS Correlation -.048 -.141 -.095 -.021 -.194 -.176 1.000 -.163 -.047 -.039 .121 -.084
Sig. (2-tailed) .091 .000 .001 .454 .000 .000 . .000 .097 .169 .000 .003
DUMMYP Correlation -.015 -.113 .037 -.009 -.311 -.282 -.163 1.000 -.007 -.054 .006 .012
Sig. (2-tailed) .606 .000 .191 .761 .000 .000 .000 . .812 .057 .826 .679
DUMMYFC Correlation .066 .046 .073 .126 .010 .122 -.047 -.007 1.000 .503 .118 -.055
Sig. (2-tailed) .020 .102 .010 .000 .731 .000 .097 .812 . .000 .000 .052
Sig. (2-tailed) .020 .102 .010 .000 .731 .000 .097 .812 . .000 .000 .052
DUMMYTC Correlation .054 .038 .082 .112 -.006 .186 -.039 -.054 .503 1.000 .195 -.033
DUMMYTC Correlation .054 .038 .082 .112 -.006 .186 -.039 -.054 .503 1.000 .195 -.033
Sig. (2-tailed) .059 .178 .004 .000 .834 .000 .169 .057 .000 . .000 .249
Sig. (2-tailed) .059 .178 .004 .000 .834 .000 .169 .057 .000 . .000 .249
DUMMYIND Correlation -.076 -.074 .148 .033 .006 .222 .121 .006 .118 .195 1.000 .065
DUMMYIND Correlation -.076 -.074 .148 .033 .006 .222 .121 .006 .118 .195 1.000 .065
Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .009 .000 .249 .834 .000 .000 .826 .000 .000 . .022
Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .009 .000 .249 .834 .000 .000 .826 .000 .000 . .022
DUMMYPRM Correlation -.123 .406 .470 -.225 -.044 .022 -.084 .012 -.055 -.033 .065 1.000
DUMMYPRM Correlation -.123 .406 .470 -.225 -.044 .022 -.084 .012 -.055 -.033 .065 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .120 .435 .003 .679 .052 .249 .022 .
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .120 .435 .003 .679 .052 .249 .022 .26
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